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1. Introduction 
Since the introduction of the Workplace Relations Act (WRA) in 1996, the traditional 
forms of employment regulation in the federal jurisdiction have been augmented by 
Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs).  Unlike awards and certified agreements, 
both of which are collective forms of regulation, AWAs may provide for individual forms 
of regulation, and thus mark a significant change to the federal system of employment 
relations.  The first part of this paper describes the system of awards and collective 
agreements that operate in the federal industrial relations system. The second part of the 
paper examines the incidence of AWAs and makes a number of observations based on a 
previous study (Plowman, Watson and Kelly 2001)2.  This second part is more a pointer 
for further research than an authoritative evaluation of the current experience.  
 
2. Employment Regulation in The Federal System 
Employees whose conditions of employment are governed by the federal jurisdiction may 
have these conditions regulated by one or more of three ways: awards of the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC); certified agreements of the AIRC; or AWAs 
which are overseen by the Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA).  As outlined in a 
subsequent section of the paper, there is a complicated pattern of award and agreement 
coverage. 
 
The AIRC’s database OSIRIS lists 1,145 awards.3  Not all of these are general conditions 
awards. Some are single-issue awards (long service leave, superannuation, plant closure 
etc) and are not relevant to the analysis of annual leave loadings.  A number of single 
enterprise awards are auxiliary or supplementary awards. In these cases many of the 
substantive conditions of employment are determined by a parent multi-employer award. 
The database also contains the names of a number of awards that may be deemed to have 
ceased to exist under s151 of the WRA.   
 
In an attempt to determine the number of general conditions awards, the contents of 370 
awards (32 per cent of all awards) were examined. This suggests that 11.7 per cent of 
awards are single-issue awards; 49.7 per cent of awards are dependent awards; and 7.3 
per cent of the listed awards have ceased to operate. In all 68.7 per cent of the awards 
examined were not general conditions awards. The exclusion of single issue and obsolete 
awards suggest that about 360 of the awards are general awards, that is, to the extent 
permitted by the Workplace Relations Act 1996, they attempt to regulate conditions 
generally.4 
 
OSIRIS lists over 30,000 certified agreements. Our analysis suggests that a number of 
these are agreements have been superseded. For example, the Regency Electrical and 
Mechanical Services Pty Ltd Enterprise Agreements for 1994, 1997-2000, 1999-2000 and 
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2000-2003 are all to be found on the database. Only the last of these agreements is 
current. 
 
Our analysis further suggests that between 60 per cent and 70 per cent of the agreements 
listed in OSIRIS are superseded agreements. In addition, a small number of agreements 
are single-issue agreements, or agreements that seek to clarify issues in existing 
agreements or awards. We concluded that about 10,000 of the listed agreements are 
current and not limited to one issue. 
  
We analysed in depth the contents of 250 randomly chosen agreements.  The agreements 
conform, in the main, to one of two principal types: either they supplement the parent 
awards, or they seek to prescribe conditions generally, and in so doing exclude recourse 
to an award.   
 
The first group of certified agreements has multiplied in recent years as a result of the 
requirement for awards to be ‘simplified’ and limited to “allowable matters” (see note 4).   
 
The second grouping of certified agreements can be further divided into two groups: 
those made before 1996 and those made after the introduction of the WRA.  The 
significance of this divide is that the former agreements are, in effect, awards dating to a 
time when agreements reached by the parties could be ratified by the AIRC as either 
consent awards or certified agreements.  The latter took on the form, structure and 
wording of awards.  Though they were not necessarily limited to a single employer or 
enterprise in theory, in practice they were almost universally single employer agreements.  
Few, if any, of these pre-1996 certified agreements sought to change the generally 
accepted industrial standards. 
 
Most certified agreements are post 1996 agreements.  They do not seek to provide for 
general conditions of employment. In the main they are supplementary agreements that 
take up the award conditions that have had to be shed in the award simplification process. 
About 14 per cent of the agreements examined are general conditions agreements, and 
thus provide for conditions of employment to the exclusion of any award.  
 
As already noted, unlike certified agreements which are collective agreements, AWAs 
are individual agreements. They are individually signed, even in cases where a company 
employs a large number of employees in terms of the same agreement. 
 
The OEA provides a sample of 100 AWAs for examination.5 We have examined this 
sample of AWAs in relation to annual leave and annual leave loading provisions to see 
the extent to which they add flexibility compared to awards or collective agreements. We 
conclude that many AWAs indirectly affect annual leave loadings because they prescribe 
increased wages. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the increased wages translate 
into increased annual leave loadings. 
 
AWAs have also sought to effect, in a direct way, annual leave and loadings provisions 
of awards. They have sought to do so in a number of ways: absorption of loadings into 
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annualised wages or “all-up” rates of pay; cashing out of accrued annual leave; increasing 
annual leave loading entitlements; increasing annual leave entitlements; increasing the 
period for annual leave at reduced pay; reducing annual leave loading entitlements; and 
eliminating annual leave loadings.  
 
Table 2 gives details of the proportion of AWAs in the sample that included any of these 
provisions. 
 
Table 2 
Proportion of AWAs Directly Affecting Annual Leave and/or Annual Leave 
Loadings Provisions, January 2001 
 
Variation to Award Conditions Proportion of Sample ( per 
cent) 
Absorption of annual leave loadings 17 
Cashing out of accrued annual leave 9 
Additional annual leave loading entitlements 3 
Additional annual leave entitlements 2 
Additional annual leave at reduced pay 2 
Reduction in annual leave loadings 1 
Elimination of Leave Loadings 1 
Total 33 
Source:  Compiled from sample of AWAs publicly provided by OEA. Total does not sum as one AWA 
included two of the listed variations. 
 
There are a small number of collective (certified) agreements that contain absorption of 
annual leave loadings provisions. Our analysis of AWAs suggests that a greater 
proportion of these agreements provide for the absorption of leave loadings into an all-up 
rate of pay or annualised pay. Absorption appears to be high in the mining sector (75 per 
cent of sample AWAs), construction and wholesale (50 per cent each), communications 
(40 per cent) and property services 20 per cent. The small number of AWAs for each 
sector in the sample, however, would suggest caution in interpreting this data. 
 
One third of the sample AWAs provide for the cashing out of accrued leave. The major 
reason for this cashing out seems to be the regulation of untaken leave and limiting such 
leave to no more than 40 days.6 Provisions for cashing out accrued leave were most 
prevalent in the finance and insurance sector. 
 
All of the AWAs providing for additional annual leave loadings were public sector 
agreements. The relevant award provides a ceiling for the amount of loadings payable 
(17.5 per cent of $51,378). The AWAs increase the threshold by 2.25 per cent. Additional 
leave on reduced pay is also found only in the public sector. The rationale of this 
provision is the better balancing of family and work responsibilities. Two AWAs 
increased annual leave entitlements by one week. One of these was in the health sector, 
the other in mining. One AWA, in property services, reduced annual leave loadings to 
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12.5 per cent. Another, in retail, removed annual leave loadings and provided that 
payment while on annual leave will be “based on the current ordinary hourly rate”. 
 
Our investigation of AWAs suggest that though they apply to a very small proportion of 
the workforce, they provide for a greater degree of variation than awards or certified 
agreements in the area of annual leave loadings. 
 
3.  The AWA Experience: Evaluating the Evidence  
In this part of the paper a number of observations concerning the AWA experience are 
offered.  The following areas are addressed: enumerating AWAs; AWA take up; AWA 
exclusivity; AWAs and flexibility; AWA collectivism.  
 
3.1 Enumerating AWAs 
OEA data indicate that by January 2001 a total of 150,079 AWAs had been made.  By the 
end of July 2001 this number had increased to 182,437.  By the latter date some 3303 
employers had entered into AWAs. 
 
Figure 1 shows the cumulative growth in the number of AWAs.  This suggests that there 
has been an increase in the rate of growth of AWAs over time, but that this rate has been 
relatively constant over the past five quarters.  About 15,000 new agreements are added 
in each quarter. 
 
Fig. 1  Cummulative Growth in AWAs, Q4-94 -Q2-01
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At face value this appears to be a rapid rate of growth.  In relative terms, however, the 
number of persons on AWAs remains small compared with other forms of regulation.  
Further, as awards and certified agreements are collective, their number understates their 
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coverage relative to AWAs.  One award, the Metal Trades Award, continues to cover 
more employees than all AWAs made to date.   
 
A major difficulty (and nuisance) in interpreting OEA data is that it is cumulative and 
gives little indication of the number of extant AWAs.  If the same approach was applied 
to awards and certified agreements it can be shown that there would be about 25,500 
awards and over 250,000 certified agreements.  These are interesting, but not altogether 
useful, data.  The same can be said of the AWA data.  The figure is an inflated one that 
does little to assist in determining trends in a meaningful way.  It is unclear, for example, 
whether 15,000 new employees are being added to the AWA list, or whether a number of 
these inclusions represent AWA renewals.  It would be useful for the OEA to 
complement the historical data with a proactive approach to determine extant data.  
Though it would be difficult for the OEA to account for those AWAs that lapse by virtue 
of labour turnover, it seems possible for the AWA data base to be adjusted to take 
account of those employers who move out of AWAs and for AWAs that are renewed and 
therefore replace existing agreements.  
 
Figure 1 provides a schematic of AWA enumeration.  The present system of enumeration 
adds new AWAs to existing ones without any consideration of any leakages that may 
occur.  Leakages may occur for a number of reasons: 
a) AWAs may not be renewed. 
b) On the employer side, the company in question may go out of existence either 
through failure or takeover. 
c) Also on the employer side, the company may seek to enter into collective forms 
of regulation or may seek to move out of the formal sector. 
d) On the employee side, employees may leave their employer or the workforce. 
 
It is evident from the above that the relevant number of extant AWAs is provided by the 
computation of de novo AWAs, renewed AWAs and “live” AWAs.  The last named have 
to be discounted for leakages. 
 
In attempting to quantify the number of extant AWAs the OEA data may be discounted 
in the following manner: 
 
a) Six per cent of employers (198) no longer continue to be parties to AWAs.7  We 
have no evidence as to the numbers employed by these employers, nor of when 
they discontinued involvement with AWAs.  Determining the number of defunct 
AWAs involves some guess work and assumptions.  OEA data show that nearly 
78% of employees with AWAs work in establishments employing 100 or more 
employees.  The data also show that 70 per cent of employers with AWAs employ 
less than 100 employees.  If we assume an average of 20 employees per AWA, 
the number of defunct AWAs by virtue of employers leaving the AWA fold 
would number nearly 4,000.  This figure underestimates the attrition on this count 
since it does not enumerate employers moving out of AWAs because of business 
failure. 
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b) Under the provisions of the WRA, AWAs have a life of three years.  Assuming 
that the signatories to AWAs have complied with this requirement of the Act, 
AWAs made before September 1998 can be considered to be obsolete.  This 
would result in the omission of some 26,000 AWAs.    
 
c) Account must also be taken of those employees who leave their employer, thus 
terminating any agreement.  The ABS data on job mobility suggests that 16 per 
cent of employees change their employer or location in any one year (ABS 
6209.0).  If this rate of mobility is applied for those under AWAs made to January 
2001, and half that rate applied to the agreements made in the half year to July 
2001, then a further 26,600 AWAs can be discounted. 
 
Taking all factors into account, and making some allowances for double counting, the 
above estimates would suggest that about 40 per cent of the AWAs made to date are 
obsolete.  This presents a different view of the impact of AWAs than may be presented 
on the basis of cumulative data.  The methodology used in arriving at the number of 
extant AWAs may be the subject of criticism.  This only serves to highlight the need for a 
better approach by the OEA.  If the present system of enumeration is maintained, the 
cumulative figure provided will increasingly be meaningless.   
 
It is unclear how the above analysis affects the OEA’s own analysis of AWAs.  The OEA 
provides details of AWAs classified by industry, industry penetration, gender, size of 
employer and other factors.  If cumulative data continue to be used for these purposes, 
outcomes may be less and less reliable over time. 
 
3.2 AWA Take Up 
The number of employees working under AWAs represents a very small proportion of 
the 9 million members of the workforce and only between one and two per cent 
(depending on the number of extant AWAs) of federal jurisdiction employees.8 Since 
AWAs are not necessarily mutually exclusive of awards and agreements (a matter taken 
up below) the proportion of employees working exclusively under the provisions of 
AWAs cannot be determined.  In order to ascertain this figure one would need to know 
whether or not the AWAs in question are supplementary to awards/certified agreements, 
or are general conditions agreements that exclude awards and certified agreements.9 
 
The factors inhibiting the take up of AWAs are worthy of investigation.  Unions have 
opposed AWAs.10  They have not sought to use them as vehicles for improved conditions 
(see below).  However, it is not clear from the information provided by the OEA whether 
AWAs are being taken up in the traditional union sectors of the economy or the non-
unionised sectors.  There is inferential evidence to suggest that AWAs are being taken up 
in the unionised sector as a means of union avoidance.11 
 
What should be a major concern for advocates of AWAs is their limited take up in sectors 
where unions are not capable of influencing whether or not employees enter into AWAs.  
In the absence of any research and empirical evidence it is only possible to hypothesis 
some of the reasons for employer/employee avoidance of AWAs.  The first of these is  
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that those operating in the informal sector (i.e. employers not bound by awards or 
agreements) see little value in formalising their relationships in the absence of union 
pressures or legislative requirements.  By having good systems of human resource 
management employers may reduce employees’ demands for a formal approach to the 
employment relationship.  I suspect that general satisfaction with an informal approach 
by both parties is a major factor in disinterest in AWAs. 
 
A second factor is that many employers may find sufficient flexibility in awards and 
certified agreements.  The issues of award fragmentation/flexibility are taken up in a 
subsequent section.   
 
A third factor, particularly in the ‘informal’ sector, may be the ‘no disadvantage test’.  By 
paying the award rate employers are able to maintain their workers. By not entering 
AWAs they are not opening up the possibility of added costs.  This is particularly so if 
any employees seek to have a union act as their agent.  
 
There would also appear to be reasons inhibiting employees from seeking AWAs.  The 
major of these is the perception that AWAs are employer instruments of regulation.  
Despite Ministerial and OEA calls to the contrary, the operations of AWAs suggest good 
reasons for this view.  Firstly, the limited evidence suggests that most AWAs are 
employer-initiated.12 There appear to be few cases of employee initiation.  Secondly, 
there is evidence of a ‘take-it-or leave-it’ approach by employers to employees, in 
particular at the point of engagement.  Thirdly, despite the fact that AWAs are intended 
to be individual forms of contract, a common employee complaint identified by OEA 
case studies is their lack of involvement in the making of agreements.13 
 
At face value, AWAs could be a useful union method of sea-sawing improvements in 
conditions, particularly since they are, in practice, collective forms of regulation (see 
below). However, the fact that the same objective can be achieved by using certified 
agreements helps reinforce union opposition to AWAs.  Employers may have a similar 
view, and may not consider the transaction costs involved in moving to AWAs to be 
warranted.   
 
The reasons for AWA take up and avoidance remains a fruitful area for examination. 
 
3.3 AWA Exclusivity 
Since the 1980s there have been attempts, through industrial legislation, to reduce the 
effects of multi-enterprise awards and to have employment conditions governed by either 
collective workplace agreements or individual agreements.  It is often assumed that 
AWAs are mutually exclusive of awards and certified agreements.  This assumption is 
reinforced in those cases were AWAs are entered into with the intention of avoiding 
being roped into an award.14  In practice, life is more complicated than suggested by this 
neat dichotomy.  
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Figure 2  Relationship Between Federal Awards, Certified Agreements and Australian 
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The three forms of federal regulation of employment relations are not mutually exclusive 
of each other (Figure 2).  Many awards are dependent or supplementary awards that rely 
on a parent award.  Similarly, most certified agreements (about 86 per cent) are 
supplementary to awards.  AWAs, in turn, may be subordinate agreements to awards 
and/or certified agreements. Our study of annual leave loadings highlighted that 
employees could have access to all three forms of regulation simultaneously.15  It is now 
common, indeed the norm, for employees to be regulated by both awards and certified 
agreements.  This situation has been forced on employers and employees by the 
“simplification” requirements of the WRA that reduce the content of awards to 20 
“allowable matters”.  Most certified agreements continue to complement awards.  In our 
study we determined that about 14% of certified agreements were general conditions 
agreements.  We also found that in at least one sector, the ‘non-allowable’ matters had 
been taken out of the award and applied in a uniform and consistent way to each of the 
employer respondents.  The only variations in these “enterprise” agreements were the 
names of the respondents.16  
 
Our analysis suggests that the process of award simplification has given rise to a plethora 
of certified agreements – in excess of 10,000.  This figure compares with the 
approximately 700 certified agreements in 1994.  Large companies have a large number 
of agreements relating to either localities or working groups. BHP, for example, is the 
first named party to nearly 120 certified agreements. Unions are also the parties to many 
certified agreements. The Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, 
Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia is the first-named party to over 
450 agreements while the Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union is the first-
named party to over 1,640 agreements. Though the intent of the WRA is that workplace 
agreements better reflect local conditions, our analysis suggests that at this stage certified 
agreements often tend to provide uniform conditions around the parent award from which 
they were spun.   
 
It should not be assumed that AWAs provide a substantially different regime to single 
employer certified agreements.  That is matter that needs to be tested.  In doing so, an 
understanding of the non-exclusive nature of the three forms of regulation is important in 
understanding current trends.  This is particularly important for statistical analysis where 
there is a tendency to place data in one or another mechanism compartment, without 
taking account of the complementary nature of regulatory mechanisms. 17  Figure 2 
indicates the intricate and tortuous paths that need negotiating before the exclusivity and 
therefore independence of AWAs can be established.  This may be less daunting than 
supposed.  Since AWAs are essentially collective instruments of regulation (despite the 
fact that they are individually signed) an examination of the 3000 or so employer 
respondents would provide a useful vehicle for streamlining the search. 
 
3.4  AWAs and Flexibility 
A major benefit alleged for AWAs is their flexibility, relative to other forms of 
regulation.  There is some support for this.  Our study on annual leave loadings, for 
example, suggests that parent awards are the least flexible of the regulatory instruments, 
and AWAs the most flexible. The flexibility continuum may be represented by Figure 3. 
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The above finding should be treated as an interim one pending further evaluation.  As 
noted in an earlier part of the paper, the sample of awards was biased in favour of multi-
employer, parent awards.  The comparison of AWAs with parent, multi-employer awards 
necessarily means that they are more flexible.  What is less evident is whether or not they 
are more flexible than single company/enterprise awards and certified agreements.  That 
audit is still to be undertaken. 
 
It is well to remember that the quest for employment flexibility has been an ongoing one 
for a long time.  AWAs have added a variant to that search; they have not initiated it.  
Export-oriented enterprises, or those that compete with imports, have had to be concerned 
with employment flexibility since the 25% reduction in tariffs in 1974.  As the system of 
tariff protection has increasingly been removed, the impetus for employment flexibility 
has grown. 
 
Trends in this regard are evident from an examination of awards over the past four 
decades (Figure 4) and from the fragmentation of awards (Figures 2 and 5).  Figure 4 
gives details of the growth in the number of federal awards between 1954 and 2000. It 
will be seen that the number of awards has grown steadily over the period, registering a 
five-fold increase.  Multi-employer awards also increased, but by only half the general 
rate.  By contrast, single employer awards grew by six times the general rate. As with 
certified agreements and AWAs, care must be exercised in interpreting this data.  Many 
of the single employer awards are supplementary awards that rely on parent awards for 
many of the substantive conditions of employment.  Nevertheless, a large number of 
single employer awards and certified agreements are general conditions documents.  
These are the relevant awards and agreements for comparison with AWAs.  That 
comparison has not as yet been made.  The issue of flexibility cannot be unambiguously 
determined until there is such a comparison.  Though intuitively one may suspect that 
AWAs are the most flexible, it may be that single employer awards and certified 
agreements provide similar scope for flexibility as AWAs (see section 3.4). 
 
 
Figure 3  Relative Flexibility, Awards, Certified Agreements and AWAs 
 
MULTI-EMPLOYER AWARDS 
GENERAL CONDITIONS SINGLE AWARDS 
 GENERAL CONDITIONS CERTIFIED AGREEMENTS 
  SUPPLEMENTARY AWARDS 
   SUPPLEMENTARY CERTIFIED AGREEMENTS 
    GENERAL CONDITIONS AWAs 
     SUPPLEMENTARY AWAs 
 
 
Least Flexible               Most Flexible 
acirrt, university of sydney 13 
 
The award fragmentation process is shown in Figure 5.  This process has resulted in 
import competing industries (such as car manufacturing) and export oriented industries 
(such as the aluminum industry) developing industry, company and enterprise awards in 
rapid succession.  The Metal Industry Award, for many decades both the benchmark and 
the pace-setting award, was fragmented in 1972 to give rise to the private sector Metal 
Trades Award. The rationale for this divide was to reduce public sector inhibitions on  
changes to employment standard in the MIA that still applies to public employers.  Since 
that time a number of “sub-industry” awards have been spun off, not all of which are 
depicted.  Ironically, the Metal Trades (Construction) Award was spun off to prevent 
flow-ons from the construction industry to the metal trades industry that by now had been 
opened up to import competition.  It will be seen that industries such as car 
manufacturing and aluminum refining further fragmented into company specific awards, 
and in many cases further into site or enterprise specific awards. 
 
 
3.4 AWA Collectivism 
AWAs must be individually signed.  As a result of such signing they may constitute 
individual statutory agreements.  In most other respects, however, they remain a 
collective form of regulation.  It is evident from OAE data that many enterprises have a 
large number of AWAs that are similarly or identically worded.  Thus, the notion that 
AWAs are individually negotiated and agreed upon is questionable. 
A number of reasons may be given for the low level of individual input in AWA 
negotiations.  Firstly, for new employees existing AWAs may be a condition of 
employment.  For these there are no negotiations.  Secondly, the transaction costs 
involved in individual negotiations would be beyond the resources of most organisations.  
Thirdly, comparative wage (and conditions) justice is still alive despite intentions to the 
contrary.  The primary method by which workers negotiating individual contracts of 
employment can be assured that the rate they are being paid is reasonable is by  
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Fig. 4:  Federal Awards, by Type, 1954 - 2000
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Fig. 5 Award Fragmentation: Metal Industry Award 1952 – 1998 
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 comparison with rates paid for similar classifications of employees.  Though an 
employer has the opportunity to pay a higher rate, that employer’s capacity to reduce the 
rate would be limited, a matter supported by the ‘no disadvantage test’.  Under these 
circumstances there is merit in paying like classifications the same rate.  The same 
applies to other conditions of employment. 
 
Collectivism has an important bearing on flexibility.  Three forms of flexibility may be 
identified for present purposes: ‘range flexibility’ (the degree to which employment 
standards may depart from award norms); ‘within flexibility’ (flexibility within an 
organisation in respect of employment conditions); and ‘without flexibility’ (employment 
flexibility relative to other organisations).  The tentative conclusions that may be arrived 
at based on the foregoing analyses is that collectivism reduces the scope for ‘within 
flexibility’.  There appears to be little desire to attempt flexibility in employment 
conditions on an individual basis within an organisation.  In this respect, AWAs may be 
no more flexible than other collective forms of employment.  As noted in section 3.3, 
AWAs may, or may not, provide greater ‘without flexibility than single employer awards 
and certified agreements.  AWAs may provide for greater ‘range flexibility’ than awards.  
Union interest in uniformity and consistency would suggest this might be so in the case 
of multi-employer awards, but the case is not proven in respect of single employer 
awards and certified agreements. 
 
If the foregoing has any merit, it would suggest that employers’ interest in AWAs may be 
based upon an assumed rather than proven notion of flexibility.  Their interest is more 
likely to arise out an interest in a reduced role for unions and the capacity to formalise 
relations in the increasing non-union sectors of the economy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has provided details of the formsof regulation in the federal system, with 
particular emphasis on AWAs, the only form of individual agreement making in that 
system.  It has highlighted a number of areas of potential study in evaluating the AWA  
experience.  These impinge on the enumeration of AWAs, the rate of take up or 
avoidance, AWA exclusivity, and AWA flexibility.  The paper concludes that though 
AWAs are more flexible than multi-employer awards, their flexibility relative to single 
employer awards/agreements is unproven  It is proposed that the collectivist nature of 
AWAs diminishes their relative capacity for flexibility. 
 
NOTES 
 
1. This paper is based on a paper presented at "The AWA Experience: Evaluating the Evidence" 
Conference, Sydney, 7/9/01. 
 
2. See Plowman, D., Watson, R.  and Kelly, R. (2001) Flexibility in Annual Leave Loading, Final Report, 
The Centre for Labour Market Research, Murdoch University.  The study was commissioned by the 
Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business. 
 
3. The AIRC’s Annual Report for 2000/2001 suggests that there has been an increase in the number of 
awards was 1689. (AIRC, Annual Report 2000/2001, www. Airc.gov.au 
 
4. The Act restricts the contents of awards to 20 “allowable matters”. 
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5. The sample “is representative of agreements which have been approved by the Employment Advocate 
over the past three years. The sampling methodology ensures that the number of sample AWAs in any 
given industry is directly proportional to the distribution of employees with AWAs by industry” (OEA, 
2001). 
 
6. Illustrative of this approach is the AWA coded FIN01 in the sample AWAs: ‘…You are entitled to 
twenty working days paid annual leave after each completed year of service. Annual leave may only be 
accrued beyond twenty days for a specific purpose and with your manager’s approval. You cannot 
accrue more than forty days annual leave… If you have previous service and have in excess of forty 
days accrued annual leave at the commencement date of this AWA, you must provide your manager 
with a plan showing how you will reduce the level of accrual below forty days within the term of this 
AWA.’   
 
7. See Paul Gollan, ‘AWA Trends’, www.oea.gov.au. 
 
8. The reach of AWAs is greater than those under federal awards by virtue of Division 2 agreements.  
These apply to those areas of commerce and industry coming under the corporations power of the 
Common-wealth. 
 
9. Under the WRA, AWAs may over-ride awards and certified agreements.  This does not give them 
exclusivity over employment matters unless that is the intent of the agreement in question. 
 
10. See, for example, the OEA case study on Peabody Resources, Ravenswood. 
 
11. OEA data indicate that a high proportion of employers making AWAs are in manufacturing (9.7% of 
employers with AWAs), retail (15.3%), transport (9.5%), construction (5%), wholesale (65), health 
and community services (8%), government (7%) and mining (3%).  These are unionised industries.  
Further evidence is provided by the OEA case studies on D&S Concerting and Peabody Resources. 
 
12. Ilustrative of this is the OEA’s case study of Telstra.  The AWA currently only applies to Level 5 
employees.  The case study notes that “It is Telstra’s intention to offer AWAs to employees in Level 6 
roles”. 
 
13. Three of the five OEA case studies suggest this: the D&S Concreting case, the Medical Transport 
Services case, the Pharmacia & Upjohn case,  
 
14. See, for example, the OEA case studies on Pharmacia & Upjohn and D&S Concreting. 
 
15. In practice, there is a significant degree of overlap between awards, certified agreements and 
Australian Workplace Agreements. Some awards not only prescribe substantive conditions of 
employment, but also make provision for additional regulation by way of both certified agreements 
and Australian Workplace Agreements (see, for example 100 Per Cent Pty Ltd [sic] Collective 
Bargaining Agreement 1997-1999, clauses 4 and 7). Many of the Australian Workplace Agreements 
approved to January 2001 were supplementary agreements to awards.  The latter specified most of the 
substantive conditions of employment.  Our study suggested that over 80 per cent of certified 
agreements are supplementary agreements to awards.  Thus, in identifying conditions of employment, 
the three forms of regulation are not mutually exclusive.  
 
16. The industry in question related to private nursing homes. 
 
17. For example, in its July 2000 publication Award and Agreement Coverage 1999: A Summary of the 
Main Findings, DEWRSB suggests a shift away from awards to agreements.  It concludes that 44 per 
cent of employees were covered by registered or informal agreements in 1995, and that this had 
increased to 64 per cent in 1999.  The evidence is based on a survey of wage rates, with award 
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employees being those who are paid only the award rate.  The major conclusion does not recognise that 
overaward agreements, by definition, apply to award employees, nor the complementary nature of 
awards and agreements.  Since these are not mutually exclusive vehicles for determining employees 
conditions, the conclusion arrived at is not justified. 
 
 
